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Thong Ah Fat v Public Prosecutor [2011] SGCA 65 
 
 
Overview of the decision 
The accused was charged under the Misuse of Drugs Act1 after being found with 142.41 
grams of diamorphine at the Woodlands Checkpoint. The High Court Judge found the 
accused guilty and sentenced him to death in a brief judgment of five paragraphs.2 The Court 
of Appeal, however, ordered a retrial as it was of the view that the Judge’s reasoning was 
“unclear” and the “judicial duty to give reasoned decisions” was not discharged.3  
Although it may seem like a basic legal principle that a judge has a judicial duty to give 
reasoned decisions, it would appear that Thong Ah Fat is the first local case to explore this 
duty in some detail.4 We hope to build upon the Court of Appeal’s analysis as follows:  
(i) the criterion to determine when reasons ought to be given;  
(ii) how the reasons should be expressed;  
(iii) the scope and depth of reasoning required;  
(iv) what justice and fairness entail; and  
                                                           
* LL.B. (First) NUS, LL.M., Harvard; Assistant Professor of Law, Singapore Management University. 
** LL.B. (Summa) SMU; Practice Trainee, Rajah & Tan LLP. 
1 Cap 185, 2008 Rev Ed. 
2 Public Prosecutor v Thong Ah Fat [2010] SGHC 227. 
3 Thong Ah Fat v Public Prosecutor [2011] SGCA 65 at [13] (“Thong Ah Fat”). Specifically, the Court of Appeal 
took issue with the lack of explanation as to: (a) whether the accused had knowledge of the drugs he possessed; 
(b) why the Judge did not believe the accused’s evidence; (c) the exact treatment of the accused’s cautioned 
statement, ie, whether an adverse inference was drawn and why; (d) whether one of the accused’s statement was a 
confession or admission; (e) why there was no reference to a previous delivery by the accused; and (f) why the 
accused’s six long statements were not set out in the judgment. 
4 The Court of Appeal did not cite any local cases (instead, English and Australian cases were cited) when it set 
out the rationale, scope, and content of the judicial duty to give reasoned decisions, although Lai Wee Lian v 
Singapore Bus Service (1978) Ltd [1984] 1 AC 729 was cited (at [14]) for the proposition that the judicial duty to 
give reasoned decisions “is a duty which is inherent in our common law”. It would appear then that Thong Ah Fat 
is a modern statement of the law in this area, as opposed to a modern restatement of the law. 
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(v) the duty to give reasons exists equally in civil proceedings. 
Criterion to determine when reasons ought to be given 
This is the first (threshold) question that must be answered. The overriding principle is to 
strike a balance between having some explanation and unduly burdening courts which may 
result in increased costs and delays. Although the Singapore Judiciary can be said to be 
generally efficient in dealing with its caseload in recent years,5 the correct approach as 
identified by the Court of Appeal to be applied in all situations is to have a “standard of 
explanation which corresponds to the requirements of the case”.6 Thus, where the decision is 
extremely straightforward or where the matter pertains to certain types of interlocutory 
applications with a procedural focus, reasons will probably not be necessary.7 
How the reasons should be expressed 
In cases where reasons ought to be given, the Court of Appeal said that, as a general guide, 
the statement of reasons should be set out in the following structure: first, the statement 
ought to set out in summary form all the key relevant evidence; second, the statement should 
briefly set out the parties’ opposing stances and both the primary and inferential facts found 
by the judge; third, the statement should examine the relevant evidence and the facts found 
with a view to explaining the final outcome on each material issue; and fourth, the judge has 
to explain how the final conclusion was arrived at.8 
What is apparent from this set of guidelines is that it only pertains to matters of evidence and 
fact-finding. It is not clear what stopped the Court of Appeal to go a step further to include 
guidelines relating to how legal authorities should be cited and marshalled in decisions. To 
reach a verdict, a judge must necessarily apply a set of legal premises to a set of factual 
premises. If the legal premises are neglected (ie, not clearly explained), the reasoning process 
is compromised as well, and a reasoned decision becomes impossible due to lack of 
completeness. One has to proceed then, with the assumption that Thong Ah Fat only 
provides guidelines for reasoned conclusions vis-à-vis fact-finding, and not vis-à-vis legal 
propositions used to support the verdict.9 
Scope and depth of reasoning required 
As one would expect, the Court of Appeal refrained from formulating a fixed rule of universal 
application.10 However, it did establish three factors which a judge should consider in 
determining the scope and depth of reasons required.11 
First, due regard must be had to the judge’s list of hearings. The underlying concern is that 
judicial time should, as far as possible, be used effectively and efficiently. Second, the duty to 
give reasons is not important only when there is a right of appeal; indeed, the inability to 
alter the decision may make it all the more compelling for parties to understand how the 
                                                           
5 For recent statistics pertaining to our courts’ caseload, see: 
http://app.subcourts.gov.sg/subcourts/page.aspx?pageid=27801 and 
http://app.supremecourt.gov.sg/data/doc/ManagePage/44/AnnualRpt2010/TOJ_ws.html. 
6 Thong Ah Fat at [30]. 
7 Thong Ah Fat at [32]–[33]. 
8 Thong Ah Fat at [34]–[37]. 
9 This is not to suggest that Thong Ah Fat was not concerned with the proper use of authorities, but rather it did 
not provide any guidance on this. 
10 Thong Ah Fat at [41]. 
11 Thong Ah Fat at [43]–[46]. 
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decision was reached. Hence, reasons may be appropriate even when the judge is the final 
arbiter of the matter. Third, the nature of the matter before the judge also plays a role in 
determining the extent of reasons required. A straightforward matter may require fewer 
reasons and in certain cases, abbreviated oral judgments are acceptable;12 more complex or 
more significant decisions touching on public interests or resulting in changes to the law, for 
example, should contain more detailed reasons.  
It is submitted that there may be a fourth factor13 that judges should consider, viz, whether 
the level of detail in the reasons given would better persuade the parties as to the legitimacy 
of the decision and thereby reduce the likelihood of pointless challenges. Singapore is not 
considered a litigious society (unlike the United States, for example) and (on one view at 
least) it is reasonable to suggest that well-reasoned decisions may actually reduce the 
number of appeals and thereby free up precious judicial time.14 Therefore, consistent with 
the overriding principle of balancing the need for reasons with unduly burdening the judicial 
machinery, it may be apposite to provide extensive reasons where it is evident to the judge 
that to do so would, based on the characteristics of the litigants, result in finality.15 
What justice and fairness entail 
It is suggested that the most important aspect of Thong Ah Fat is the Court of Appeal’s 
express recognition that a judicial decision in this day and age cannot be justified solely on 
the fact that it was made by a judge.16 On the contrary, it emphasised that “the legal cogency 
and coherence of a decision” must be demonstrably justifiable.17 The Court of Appeal made it 
abundantly clear that it was cognisant of the immutable principle that justice must not only 
be done, it must also be seen to be done.18 The immediate corollary is an express distancing 
from legal realism, or more specifically, the strain of legal realism espoused by the eminent 
Jerome Frank who is (infamously) caricatured as having proclaimed that “justice is what the 
judge ate for breakfast”.19 Indeed, moving further into the realm of legal theory (but closer to 
credible schools of legal theory), when assessed in greater detail, Thong Ah Fat may herald 
the start of a trend towards a less positivistic approach towards law in Singapore.20 The 
tension between rule positivism and inherent morality within the law is one of the perennial 
debates that will probably never be resolved decisively.21 Notwithstanding that, one may 
posit that the Court of Appeal’s newfound emphasis on the justifiability of a decision, 
                                                           
12 Oral judgments, in certain instances, may also be more appropriate for extra-judicial reasons. 
13 We can also, tentatively, propose a fifth factor: whether producing an expedient decision (which, by definition, 
will be less expositional in setting out the factual (and legal) premises) is actually in the interests of the parties (in 
a criminal case, the accused). 
14 See Mark Elliot, “Has the Common Law Duty to Give Reasons Come of Age Yet?” [2011] Public Law 56 at 61–
64. 
15 On a more cynical view, of course, providing more reasons may achieve the opposite effect – ie, instead of 
making the trial judgment more appeal-proof, the more grounds a decision has, the more ways in which it can be 
appealed against. However, there is an important distinction to be drawn between detailed findings of fact and 
detailed expositions on the law: the former is much more difficult to assail on appeal. 
16 Ie, a person who is appointed with the power to adjudicate in a court. 
17 Thong Ah Fat at [17]. 
18 Thong Ah Fat at [24], [38], [44]. 
19 See Frederick Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer (Harvard, 2009), at 128–130. Legal realism may have been 
declared dead by legal theorists many times over the years, but it is not as though complaints of judgments being 
“arbitrary” have ever gone away – such complaints are, essentially, rooted in a belief of some strand of legal 
realism. 
20 It may be said, however, that such (seemingly) positivistic stances are largely confined to cases involving 
constitutional law and international law (both of which have peculiar attributes): see eg, Tan Seow Hon, “The 
Constitution as “Comforter”? – An Assessment of the Safeguards in Singapore’s Constitutional System” [1995] 
Sing LR 104 at 125; Chen Siyuan, “The Relationship between International Law and Domestic Law” [2011] 23 
SAcLJ 350 at [5]–[9]. 
21 See eg, Choo Han Teck, “Law and Morality in the Age of Bioscience. Part 1: The Separation of Law and Morals” 
[2004] 16 SAcLJ 9. 
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transparency, and natural justice22 is a small step towards loosening a strict rule positivism 
approach. That the innocuous-looking judgment in Thong Ah Fat may warrant such an 
interpretation is premised on two arguments.  
First, the Court of Appeal did not refer to any statute to support its finding of the existence of 
the duty to give reasons,23 and as noted earlier, the rationale, scope and extent of the duty 
was drawn virtually entirely from foreign common law jurisprudence. Unlike other duties to 
observe natural justice or give reasons imposed on tribunals by statute,24 the judicial duty 
expressed in Thong Ah Fat is, if anything, founded in the common law and not on any strict 
legal positivistic rule.25 Second, if morality is defined loosely as a “higher good”, then the 
notions of justifiability of a decision, “open justice” or the transparency of a judicial system,26 
and principles of natural justice all contain hints of morality. Insofar as the Court of Appeal 
referred to these notions as rationales for the judicial duty to give reasons, we suggest that 
there is an implicit recognition that there is a place for morality (broadly defined) within the 
Singapore legal system. This is accentuated further if one considers other normative reasons 
which have been expressed as supporting a general duty to give reasons. These include: 
respecting a litigant’s dignity;27 the need for fairness when fundamentally impacting a 
person’s right;28 and the importance of avoiding arbitrary, Kafkaesque decisions.29    
Duty to give reasons exists equally in civil proceedings  
One final note is that although the duty to give reasons as established in Thong Ah Fat was in 
the context of a criminal matter, there should not be any less of an obligation to give reasons 
in a civil matter. The authority of Flannery v Halifax Estate Agencies Ltd30 cited by the 
Court of Appeal31 related to the quashing of a trial judge’s decision in a civil case to prefer the 
opinion of one expert witness over another without explanation. Indeed, the same overriding 
criteria of a balance between having some explanation and unduly burdening courts can 
apply equally in a civil context. An accused in a criminal trial, because of the grave nature of 
the consequences, should be convicted or acquitted on justifiable grounds. Likewise, a 
plaintiff or defendant in a civil matter is entitled to the same expectation that their legal and 
equitable rights be upheld on justifiable grounds. Thus, the judicial duty to give reasons is a 
duty that applies to all court proceedings. 
                                                           
22 In this regard much ink has been spilled on Lord Diplock’s famous words in Ong Ah Chuan v PP [1981] AC 648 
at [26] concerning whether “law” (as found in Article 9 of the Constitution (1985 Rev Ed)) includes principles of 
natural justice. 
23 Perhaps an argument can be made too that in the same way that a court has inherent powers by virtue of the 
nature of its functions, a court also has inherent responsibilities, one of which is the duty to provide reasoned 
decisions. 
24 See eg, s 24 International Arbitration Act (Cap. 143A) and art 31(2) UNCITRAL Model Law on International 
Commercial Arbitration 1985. 
25 Unless, of course, one considers the judge’s power to recognise the common law as a positivistic rule of law.  
26 Thong Ah Fat at [24]. 
27 Trevor Allan, “Procedural Fairness and the Duty of Respect” (1998) 18 OJLS 497 at 499. 
28 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department Ex p. Doody [1994] 1 AC 531 at 564–565. 
29 R (on the application of Anufrijeva) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] 1 AC 604 at [28]. 
30 [2000] 1 WLR 377. 
31 Thong Ah Fat at [19]. 
